The recent human impact on the environment is so unique in the geological record that the official geological body that defines the division of geological time, the International Commission on Stratigraphy, is considering designating a new geographical epoch called the Anthropocene, calling attention to the global impacts humans, and particularly the human economy, are having on the Earth's biological, atmospheric and geological systems. Using the example of climate change, it is argued below that the magnitude, suddenness, and long-term consequences of the current human abuse of the natural world calls for a radical new approach to valuing nature, one based not on individual choice in the immediate present but rather on a socially embedded "deeper sense of time". Such an approach would move beyond attempts to "correctly price" nature based on imputed market values and would instead rely on shared social values and a concern for future generations. These shared social values can be made concrete through discursive processes drawing upon our long evolutionary history of collectively solving the problem of intergenerational sustainability.
I. Introduction
The recent human impact on the environment is so unique in the geological record that the official geological body that defines the division of geological time, the International 1 The author would like to thank Jack Hanich and Lisi Krall for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Parts of this article were adopted from Gowdy (2008 Gowdy ( , 2010a and Gowdy, Howarth and Tisdell, 2010) .
Commission on Stratigraphy, is considering designating a new geographical epoch called the Anthropocene (Jones 2011, 133 ). This will call attention to the global impacts humans, and particularly the human economy, are having on the Earth's biological, atmospheric and geological systems. The driving force behind previous major geological transitions has been natural processes like meteor impacts, massive volcanic activity and continental shifts. As the quote above shows, the current human perturbation of the global environment will have an impact of similar magnitude (Nature 2011). Yet most people are unconcerned about the looming possibility of environmental devastation and the resulting social chaos in the years to come.
What is it about our way of living and associated ways of thinking that puts so little value on the future of the planet? A major reason is the narrow logic of the global market economy which values nature solely on its contribution to the discounted present value of economic activity.
Following the logic of the market, the dominant economic model views the natural world from a financial investment perspective. Using the example of climate change, it is argued below that the magnitude, suddenness, and long-term consequences of the current human abuse of the natural world calls for a radical new approach to valuing nature, one based not on individual choice in the immediate present but rather on a socially embedded "deeper sense of time" (Wing 2011) . Such an approach would move beyond attempts to "correctly price" nature based on imputed market values and would instead rely on shared social values and a concern for future generations. These shared social values can be made concrete through discursive processes drawing upon our long evolutionary history of collectively solving the problem of intergenerational sustainability.
One of the most dramatic indicators of the Anthropocene is the increase in greenhouse gases over the past few decades. Over the past 800,000 years atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 varied between 180ppm and 280ppm (Lüthi et al. 2008) . CO 2 levels during this period are tightly correlated with temperatures and sea levels. These 50ppm fluctuations around the average of 230ppm were enough to push the earth between warm periods comparable to today's climate to extremely cold ice age conditions. In May 2011 atmospheric CO 2 levels at Mauna Loa, Hawaii passed 394ppm, an increase approaching 100ppm since the middle of the twentieth century (the Mauna Loa data is available at ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_mm_mlo.txt). When CO 2 levels were this high in the past the Earth's climate was dramatically different than today's. Tripati, Roberts and Eagle (2009) report that during the Middle Miocene, some 10-14 million years ago, CO 2 levels were slightly lower than today's (around 350ppm) but temperatures were 3C to 6C warmer and sea levels were 25 to 40 meters higher. Further back in time, around 56 million years ago, the Earth experienced the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) when temperatures rose by 8C. The PETM was probably triggered by volcanic activity which caused a release of CO 2 and frozen methane (Kump 2011, 58-59) . The estimated release of greenhouse gases (5000 petagrams) then was about the same as the total projected release due to human activity in the industrial era. But the PETM event took about 20,000 and the rate of heating was estimated to be .025C per 100 years compared to the projected rate of 1-4C per 100 years over the next few centuries. After the PETM episode it took the Earth about 200,000 years to recover. (Kump 2011) . If past climate regimes are approximate indicators of what we can expect in the future, large, abrupt, and unpredictable changes will occur for centuries to come.
In spite of international efforts to curb greenhouse gases, CO 2 emissions have grown at an annual rate of 3% per year since 2000, compared to 1.1% per year in the decade of the 1990s (Raupach et al. 2007 ) and reached record levels in 2010 (go.nature.com/rtgd7f). In view of the magnitude of emission increases, and the inertia of the world's economic and political systems, the chances of limiting the CO 2 level to one consistent with the Holocene's stable climate regime are bleak. By some estimates CO 2 levels could reach 2000 ppm within a few centuries if the readily available coal, petroleum and natural gas are burned (Kump 2002) . Kasting (1998) believes that the most likely scenario is that atmospheric CO 2 will peak at about 1200 ppm sometime in the next century. A climate-carbon model developed by Bala et al. (2005) has the business-as-usual CO 2 peak occurring around the year 2300 at 1400 ppm. Emissions scenarios by the IPCC include a worst case, carbon intensive scenario projecting a level of 1370 ppm by 2100 (Kintisch 2008) . Obviously, if CO 2 levels reach these extremes, abrupt and catastrophic climate events are likely.
2 The scientific consensus is that delaying substantial emission reductions for even a few more years may be disastrous (Jaeger, Schnellnhuber and Brovkin 2008 One positive development during the last few decades is the recognition of the global impacts of Homo sapiens on the Earth's biophysical systems and the danger these impacts pose to the viability of our species. Another positive development is the recognition of the extent to which human nature and human institutions, as well our physical characteristics, have been shaped by the forces of natural selection. Our "social brain" (Frith and Frith 2010) evolved in part to give humans the ability to change customs and technology to adapt to a quickly changing resource base compared to other animals that depended on more purely genetic adaptation. Richerson and Boyd (2005) argue that culture and complex brains were an evolutionary advantage for humans during the extreme climate volatility of past ice age transitions. The ability to use culture as an adaptive mechanism creates another source of variety-in addition to genes-upon which Darwinian selection can work. The ability of humans to adapt material culture, value systems, and behavior associated with these values, to changing conditions offers some hope in successfully managing the coming environmental transition. Judging from historical records of hunting and gathering societies (Gowdy 1998 ) and behavioral and neurological evidence, for most of our evolutionary history our value systems placed much more emphasis on the social good and much less on individual-based materialism. Understanding the uniqueness (among mammals at least) of the degree of sociality among humans may hold the key to moving toward a sustainable way of living on our finite planet. Successful policies will require an evolutionary perspective on valuing the natural world, one that goes beyond proximate causes of resource use (prices and markets) to examine ultimate causes (institutional responses to resource availability and biophysical constraints and opportunities).
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II. Truly Social Choice: The Missing Perspective in Economic Valuation
The climate change debate has forced economists to re-think the market-based approach to valuing the natural world (Ackerman 2008 , DeCanio 2003 , Nelson 2011 , Spash 2002 The distinction between ultimate and proximate causation (Tinbergen 1963 ) stresses the need for two separate and complementary explanations for all products of genetic and cultural evolution. Ultimate causation explains why a given trait exists, compared to many other traits that could exist, based largely on the winnowing action of selection. Proximate causation explains how the trait exists in a mechanistic sense. Excessive amounts of CO 2 are being pumped into the atmosphere because prices are too low (proximate cause) but more importantly because of the way industrial capitalism evolved in terms of production techniques dependent on fossil fuels, the concentration of economic and political power, and the culture of consumption (ultimate causes). It is especially important to recognize the many-to-one relationship between proximate and ultimate causation, whereby many functionally equivalent solutions can evolve in response to a given environmental challenge. Failing to distinguish between design features and specific implementation of design features can result in the inability to detect correlations and why policies work in some situations but in not others (Wilson and Gowdy 2010 ).
Weitzman 2009). The economic model is a financial investment model designed to show how a
perfectly rational individual should allocate resources so as to maximize the discounted flow of income evaluated at a particular point in time (Gowdy 2010b) . The basic inadequacies of the standard economic approach include the failure to address the existence of pure uncertainty, threshold effects, incommensurability of values, and non-substitution. These shortcomings have been widely discussed and will not be dealt with here with one exception, namely, the reliance of standard economic valuation on the assumption of individual, self-referential behaviour. 5 The economic model values future states of the environment using a so-called social discount rate.
But this discount rate is merely the individual discount rate adjusted for external effects (Krall and Gowdy 2011) . The future is valued from the perspective of an isolated individual at a specific point in time. The "social good" is simply the sum of the well-being of self-regarding individuals. Valuation decisions are stripped of their social context.
In contrast to the economic model, recent evidence from such diverse fields as anthropology, behavioural science, psychology, and neuroscience has established that humans are unique among mammals as to their degree of sociality (Chapais 2011 , Hill et al. 2011 , Wexler 2006 ). This research may point the way toward more effective environmental policy design. Dealing with climate change will require cooperation on an unprecedented scale. It is encouraging that the evolutionary success of our species is based on our ability to manage scarce resources through cooperation and collective valuation of the future consequences of our actions (Richerson and Boyd 2005, Sober and Wilson 1998) . Before getting to the details of these new findings about human sociality it is useful to briefly review the standard economic approach to valuing the future.
In the standard economic model future monetary costs and benefits are converted into "present values" by discounting them at the rate r defined by the so-called Ramsey equation:
The discount rate r is determined by the rate of pure time preference (ρ), the elasticity of consumption η, and the rate of growth of per capita consumption (g). In intuitive terms, individuals discount future economic benefits: (1) because they are impatient, and (2) because they have a declining marginal utility of money-since income and consumption levels are expected to rise, one additional unit of future consumption will provide less satisfaction than one additional unit of consumption today.
The Ramsey equation and the interpretation of its parameters show the unresolved tension between private and social valuation. The discounting debate between Stern and his critics has centered on the term ρ, the rate of pure time preference. Nordhaus (2007) for example, uses a relatively high value for ρ while Stern uses a value near zero. Stern's argument for this is clear and convincing from a social point of view, namely that the well-being of someone born in the future should not count less than that of someone born today. For Stern the choice of ρ is a social and ethical one, for Nordhaus it is a private investment decision. If the perspective is that of a self-referential individual at a point in time then ρ is positive-I care only about the lower value to me of something I get in the future as compared to having it now. If the perspective is that of the well-being of human society then there is no reason to count the utility of one generation more than that of another so ρ should be near zero. 6 Likewise the second term ηg may also be given a private or social interpretation. The elasticity of substitution η is usually given a value of 1 so that a 10% increase in income is given the same weight no matter what the absolute magnitude (see the discussion of the political economy of the use of this term in Stanton 2011).
The value of g answers the question "how well off will future generations be?" In the standard model g is a private investment concept, the growth of per capita income, and is usually assumed to be the growth rate of income over the past 100 years or so (as in both the Stern and Nordhaus models). The values of g in the Stern report and in the most widely used climate change models range between 1.5% and 2.0% (see the discussion in Quiggin 2008) . Assuming rapid economic growth will continue, discounting today's negative impact on those in the future is justified by the assumption that those living in the future will be better off than those living today (Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato 2006) . The use of average income as a universal welfare measure allows economists to sidestep questions about substitutability, irreversibility, quality of life, relative income and many other issues plaguing the standard model. By contrast, using well-being or quality of life estimates of g would highlight the negative consequences of market-induced environmental changes and the social responsibility of those in the present for those in the future.
In spite of heroic attempts to include social values in the discount rate, reducing environmental policy to choosing the "correct" discount rate reduces an intergenerational and social problem to one of individual choice at a point in time. Economic estimates of 6 Geogescu-Roegen (1974, 32) called for a zero discount rate for using irreplaceable resources or causing irreducible pollution. He argued further that: "The only way to protect future generations, at least from the excessive consumption of resources during the present bonanza, is by reeducating ourselves so as to feel some sympathy for our future fellow humans in the same way in which we have come to be interested in the well-being of our contemporary 'neighbors.'" environmental values assume that people care only about absolute income not their income relative to others. By contrast, experimental results show that economic behavior is based on preferences that depend on the relationship of the evaluator to others. This has been demonstrated in thousands of behavioral, game theoretic and neurological experiments (Gintis 2000) . Other relevant valuation considerations include inequality aversion, pure altruism, spiteful or envious preferences and altruistic punishment (Fehr and Fischbacker 2002) . Recent research results from experimental economics, behavioral psychology and decision theory have the potential to make economic analysis and policy recommendations more reflective of actual human decision-making but contemporary environmental economics largely ignores these recent theoretical and empirical advances (Knetch 2005) .
As society considers how to motivate humans to address the challenges of global environmental change, increasing attention is turning to psychological and biological insights into human behavior. Current research in behavioral science and neuroscience is confirming what critics of standard economic theory have long argued: humans are highly social mammals whose behavior deviates significantly from strict "rationality" because of social norms and evolutionary history. Our species has survived because we have evolved biological features (including brain structure) and institutional arrangements that promote cooperation. Behavioral insights have been slow to penetrate the economic policy world, but these insights may help shape more effective policy approaches to redirecting individual and system behavior.
III. Valuation and the Deep Social Structure of Humankind
New findings about human behavior and the deep social structure of the human species have important implications for the valuation of nature and the formulation of environmental policies, particularly policies having very long-run impacts such as climate change and biodiversity loss. Behavioral economics is still a new field but it has already challenged standard theory, and standard valuation practices, as much as any theoretical revolution since the 1930s.
For improving valuation techniques the most important contribution of behavioral economics and neuroscience has been to establish that human behavior is social. Humans make decisions not only as individuals addressing immediate individual problems but also as members of groups with highly evolved institutions to insure cohesion and the long-run stability of the group.
The Deep Social Structure of Human Society
Primates are exceptional in their degree of sociality but scientists are just beginning to discover the uniqueness of human sociality. For example, to a degree not seen in other primates, humans are able to form long-term cooperative bonds with non-kin. Hill et al. (2011) looked at co-residence patterns in 32 present day foraging societies and found that humans, compared to other primates, are unique in that (1) either sex may remain with their parental group, (2) adult brothers and sister may co-reside and (3) most members of a residential group are unrelated, (4) preferential bonds are maintained with spouses' relatives and relatives spouses. Generally, primary kin make up only 10% of a residential band. In other primate groups most members are closely related. Thus human cooperation cannot be explained entirely by kin selection (Trivers 1971) or inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964 Cooperation in other primates is limited to the coordination of individuals belonging to the same group. The advent of the primitive tribe moved cooperation to substantially higher levels of complexity. It paved the way for the coordination of whole social groups, hence creating the nested character of human social structure.
Evidence suggests the existence of a kind of collective intelligence of human groups related to group composition but unrelated to the characteristics of individuals within the groups.
In a recent study of group decision making, Woolley et al. (2010) found evidence for what they called a "collective intelligence factor." In two different studies, groups of two to five people were assigned a variety of tasks then the groups were ranked according to their performance of these tasks. The authors found that a collective intelligence factor explained the groups' performance and that:
The "c-factor" is not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group. (Woolley et al., 2010, 686) This research is still in its infancy but it seems to corroborate theories that humans evolved deep social, non-kin bonds as a way to adapt to environmental change. It suggests that a case can be made for valuation processes allowing for interaction and deliberation. Such deliberation can capture information and deal with uncertainty in ways that isolated individuals cannot. There may also be an "ideal" composition of groups for making critical decisions. For example, is there an ideal mix of selfish individuals and altruists in collective decision making?
What role does gender play in successful group composition? Does voting based on isolated individual decisions preclude solutions based on group deliberative valuation that might result in better outcomes? Many mammals are highly social animals with a variety of behavioral attributes that evolved to facilitate social interaction, but humans seem to be unique in their degree of sociability. Evidence for the existence of the social brain (Fehr 2009 , Frith and Frith 2010 , Singer 2009 ) suggests the need for a theory of valuation and decision making that is deliberate, other regarding, and consistent with human sociality.
The Neuroscience of the Social Brain
The uniqueness and importance of human sociality has been confirmed and enriched by neuroscience. The way the brain is organized and develops provides strong evidence for the evolutionary importance of human sociality. Most of the neurons in the human brain develop after birth and the way they are configured depends critically on how a child is socialized. It is another way that variability can be introduced into evolutionary mix. Wexler (2006, 3) writes about the evolutionary advantages of brain plasticity:
[T]he distinctive postnatal shaping of each individual's brain function through interaction with other people, and through his or her own mix of sensory inputs, creates an endless variety of individuals with different functional characteristics. This broadens the range of adaptive and problem-solving capabilities well beyond the variability achieved by sexual reproduction.
Another finding from neuroscience is the presence in the human brain of Von Economo neurons. These specialized neurons, also called spindle neurons, apparently evolved to enable people to make rapid decisions in social context (Allman, McLaughlin and Hakeem 2005, 370, Sherwood, Subiaul, and Zadwidski 2008, 433) . Deficiencies in the number of these neurons have been implicated in diseases affecting social interactions like autism and Alzheimer's.
These neurons are also found in a few other species-great apes, elephants, and whales and dolphins-although in much smaller numbers 7 . These other species are highly intelligent with complex social systems . In humans, about 85% of Von Economo neurons are formed after birth. This again points to the blurred line between heredity and socialization. Sherwood, Subiaul, and Zadwidski (2008, 433) write:
It is interesting that these specialized projection neuron types have been identified in cortical areas that are positioned at the interface between emotional and cognitive processing. Given their characteristics, it has been speculated that Von Economo neurons are designed for quick signaling of an appropriate response in the context of social ambiguity (Allman et al. 2005) . Enhancements of this ability would be particularly important in the context of fission-fusion communities, such as those of panids 7 An intriguing exception was found in an autopsy of the lowland gorilla Michael. Michael lived in a rich social environment interacting with humans and was a companion of Koko, another gorilla who taught him sign language (Patterson and Gordon 2002) . Michael was found to have considerably more VENs than other gorillas autopsied, approaching the lower end of the human range (Allman et al. 2010, 501) .
[chimpanzees and bonobos] and possibly the LCA [last common ancestor], with complex networks of social interactions and potential uncertainties at reunions.
A fission-fusion community is a kind of social group where the members gather together in one locality to sleep, but split into smaller groups to forage. Among human huntergatherers-a type of society that characterized most of human existence-fusing and splitting can be seasonal, with small bands being the group type for most of the year but coming together to form a larger group when resource availability permits (Gowdy 1998) . In this kind of social organization groups are continually changing in composition and Allman, McLaughlin and Hakeem (2005, 370) argue that Von Economo neurons help humans to adjust quickly to rapidly changing social situations:
We hypothesize that the VENs and associated circuitry enable us to reduce complex social and cultural dimensions of decision-making into a single dimension that facilitates the rapid execution of decisions. Other animals are not encumbered by such elaborate social and cultural contingencies to their decision-making and thus do not require such a system for rapid intuitive choice.
Neurological evidence confirms the uniqueness of the degree of sociality in humans. The success of our species (so far) may be largely the result of our ability to cooperate and to harness the advantages of collective decision-making. This is in sharp contrast to the economic view of the sanctity of individualistic rational choice and it has important implications for climate change and other environmental policies affecting the future of our species.
Whatever the recent successes of civil society organizations in helping to address such challenges, it seems that current responses are incommensurate with the scale of the problems we confront. It is increasingly evident that resistance to action on these challenges will only be overcome through engagement with the cultural values that underpin this resistance.
A report published by the UK World Wildlife Fund (Crompton 2010) argues that current approaches to solving global challenges are failing because they do not engage with cultural values. It seems clear that, in trying to meet these challenges, civil society organizations must champion some long-held (but insufficiently esteemed) values, while seeking to diminish the primacy of many values which are now prominent -at least in Western industrialized society (Crompton 2010, 5) . These values include the importance of family and social relationships, concern for future generations, and empathy toward others. These values are particularly important in addressing "bigger-than-self" problems-problems important to individuals but whose solution is unlikely to be justified by self-interest alone. "Immediate-self-interest" problems, by contrast, are those whose solutions are justified in terms of personal gains alone.
Related to this is the distinction between intrinsic values and extrinsic values (see Sheldon and McGregor 2000) . Intrinsic values are those that do not depend on competitive comparisons with others-a sense of community, enjoyment of friends and family, and self-actualization. Extrinsic values relate to things that have zero-sum comparisons, like material wealth and power.
Advocates of aggressive climate change policies may have missed the boat by focusing exclusively on extrinsic motivations.
IV. Harnessing Human Sociality: Environmental Governance through Deliberative Valuation
Evidence from behavioral and neuroscience evidence suggests that the degree of human sociality is unique. We apparently evolved to make critical decisions in social settings, not as isolated individuals. Understanding the social nature of decision making may be a key both to formulating successful social and environmental policies and to gain public acceptance of these policies. The human species has been so successful precisely because we have created elaborate social institutions to decide the common good (Richerson and Boyd 2005, Sober and Wilson 1998) . But concern for the common good has been eroded by economic theories and public policies increasingly focused on the individual, not the good of the group. The contrast between standard economic theory and behavioral economics is mirrored in the conflict between neoliberal democracy and deliberative democracy (Quiggin 2010) .
Neo-Liberal
Democracy -This governance model is consistent with the "isolated selfish individual" underlying the standard economic valuation of nature. This valuation framework has been consciously used to discourage public support for any sort of cooperative, collective public policy, the very kinds of policies that are critical for addressing climate change. "Social choice" is simply the sum of choices made by individuals who are "free to choose" in private markets.
The value of nature is determined by the ability of ecosystem services to contribute to economic output. This is the economic view of "weak sustainability" -sustainability as non-declining GDP (Gowdy 2000) .
Over the past few decades the dictates of the market has come to dominate the valuation discussion. Bromley (2007, 677) describes the takeover of reasoned public discourse and democratically chosen public policies by the let-the-market-decide mentality:
Suddenly, it seems that public policy is not what we thought it was. Democracy as public participation and reasoned discourse is somehow suspect-not to be trusted. It seems that the public's business cannot be properly conducted unless it adheres to the precepts of individualistic models of "rational choice" applied to collective action. … It is a quest for public policy in which applied micro-economics is deployed as the only way to impose "rationality" on an otherwise incoherent and quite untrustworthy political process. This is not a clash of worldviews. It is a clash of contending truth claims about how to figure out what is to be done in the public sphere-it is a confrontation between prescriptive consequentialism and reasoned public debate over how to get to the future.
The neoliberal public policy prescription is to set markets in motion and then let efficiency in allocation determine the socially optimal outcome. In terms of the valuation of nature, this prescription requires only that prices be "correct" and that property rights are fully specified. Moreover, it moves "democracy" from "one person, one vote" to "one dollar, one vote". And as this happens social stability and environmental sustainability are eroded in the name of efficiency and economic growth.
But human sociality offers a way out of the straightjacket of individual-based valuation.
Human society is more than a collection of isolated individuals acting only in their narrowly defined self-interest. Bromley (2007) argues that since future generations cannot express their preferences to us we have a duty to act as Regents on their behalf. We have a responsibility to protect the economic, biophysical, and social conditions that will allow them to achieve their Behavioral studies can give some clues about governance structures that facilitate cooperation. The most cooperative societies are those that have the most efficient mechanisms for punishing free riders (Henrich et al. 2006) . People are more likely to accept decisions they do not agree with if the deliberative process is perceived to be fair. Group decisions lead to better outcomes if the composition of the group is balanced in terms of gender and personality types (Woolley et al. 2010 ). Deliberative discourse is consistent with behavioral science in that it recognizes that reasoned judgment is not something undertaken by a lone organism in isolation (Nelson 2011) . Does deliberative discourse lead to the sustainable use of nature? Dryzek and Stevenson (2011) give several examples of successful consensual systems that might be a model for a global agency. Norway, for example, has integrated social and environmental movements and has had some success in moving toward environment-friendly economic policies. Deliberative polls held in Texas led to greater investment in renewable energy and conservation policies (Fishkin 2009 ). Focusing public policy on well-being rather than exclusively on per capita income may also have positive consequences for the environment. Rangel (2003) argues that providing social goods like health care, job security, and a minimum income, may play a crucial role in sustaining investment in "forward intergenerational goods" such as environmental preservation. Focusing policies on subjective indicators of happiness, rather than on per capita income, would pay a double dividend. People would be happier and also more willing to support polices promoting environmental sustainability. To fully develop a viable alternative to the neoclassical notion of sustainability, scientific measures of the factors contributing to human well-being are needed as well as indicators of the physical and biological requirements for longterm human survival.
V. Summary and Conclusions
To summarize the above discussion, the current reorganization of the Earth's life support systems is almost unprecedented in its magnitude and speed of occurrence. A major threat to the viability of the human species is rising temperatures due to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Polices to address this problem have focused on correcting market "externalities" using individual-based incentives and they have been ineffective-CO 2 and other greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow exponentially. It is argued above that environmental policy formulation should embrace our basic nature as social animals concerned with the good of the group. Current research has confirmed that humans are almost unique in their degree of sociality and this may be the primary reason humans have been so evolutionarily successful to this point. The question today is whether or not we can harness our cooperative nature on global scale to meet the unprecedented challenges we face. Our success depends on how we value the natural world and how we construct institutions articulate our social values.
It is encouraging to note that humans lived sustainably as hunter-gatherers within the confines of local ecosystems for 95 per cent of our existence as a species. We survived by creating institutions that served the well-being of the group as well as the individual. For a variety of reasons, including tapping into the stock of the earth's stored carbon energy, we broke out of those local confines. We now find ourselves once again coming up against biophysical limitations, this time imposed by the entire finite planet (Eldredge 1995) . We may be able to escape this dilemma by drawing on the unique social characteristics that define our species, the ability to cooperate and the ability to construct social, technological and economic systems in harmony with the biophysical systems that sustain us. But this will require expanding the notion of the "group" to include the entire human species. In the words of Georgescu-Roegen (2011,
102):
A new ethics is what the world needs most. If our values are right, everything else-prices, production, distribution and even pollution-has to be right. At first man has heeded (at least in a large measure) the commandment "Thou shalt not kill," a little later "Love thy neighbour as thyself." The commandment of this era is "Love thy species as thyself."
